Despite the importance of the interorganizational nature of the marketing research process, very little research has addressed how research organizations differ and how they affect each other in the conduct of ethical marketing research. The purpose of this study is to examine differences among three typical participants in the research process: corporate research departments, marketing research firms, and data subcontractors. These organizations were examined with respect to having and enforcing internal codes of conduct and the awareness and enforcement of external (...) codes of conduct. By exploring these differences, this study should help marketing researchers better understand the relationships among participants in the research process. Understanding these differences is the first step toward controlling the potential for ethical conflict among research participants. (shrink)

Men often make riskier decisions than women across a wide range of real-life behaviors. Whether this sex difference is accentuated, diminished, or stable under stressful conditions is, however, contested in the scientific literature. A critical blind spot lies amid this contestation: Most studies use standardized, laboratory-based, cognitive measures of decision making rather than complex real-life social simulation tasks to assess risk-related behavior. To address this blind spot, we investigated the effects of acute psychosocial stress on risk decision making in men (...) and women using a standardized cognitive measure and a novel task that simulated a real-life social situation. Participants were exposed to either an acute psychosocial stressor or an equivalent control condition. Stressor-exposed participants were further characterized as high- or low-cortisol responders. Results confirmed that the experimental manipulation was effective. On the IGT, participants characterized as low-cortisol responders made significantly riskier decisions than those characterized as high-cortisol responders. Similarly, in the online chatroom, participants characterized as low-cortisol responders were, relative to those in the Non-Stress group, significantly more likely to make risky decisions. Together, these results suggest that at lower levels of cortisol both men and women tend to make riskier decisions in both economic and social spheres. (shrink)

We report on the deliberations of an interdisciplinary group of experts in science, law, and philosophy who convened to discuss novel ethical and policy challenges in stem cell research. In this report we discuss the ethical and policy implications of safety concerns in the transition from basic laboratory research to clinical applications of cell-based therapies derived from stem cells. Although many features of this transition from lab to clinic are common to other therapies, three aspects of stem cell biology pose (...) unique challenges. First, tension regarding the use of human embryos may complicate the scientific development of safe and effective cell lines. Second, because human stem cells were not developed in the laboratory until 1998, few safety questions relating to human applications have been addressed in animal research. Third, preclinical and clinical testing of biologic agents, particularly those as inherently complex as mammalian cells, present formidable challenges, such as the need to develop suitable standardized assays and the difficulty of selecting appropriate patient populations for early phase trials. We recommend that scientists, policy makers, and the public discuss these issues responsibly, and further, that a national advisory committee to oversee human trials of cell therapies be established. **NB we did not reccommend a NAC, we think it might be appropriate**. (shrink)

If stem cell-based therapies are developed, we will likely confront a difficult problem of justice: for biological reasons alone, the new therapies might benefit only a limited range of patients. In fact, they might benefit primarily white Americans, thereby exacerbating long-standing differences in health and health care.

Concepts: Core Readings traces the develoment of one of the most active areas of investigation in cognitive science. This comprehensive volume brings together the essential background readings on concepts from philosophy, psychology, and linguistics, while providing a broad sampling of contemporary research. The first part of the book centers around the fall of the Classical Theory of Concepts in the face of attacks by W.V.O. Quine, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Eleanor Rosch, and others, emphasizing the emergence and development of the Prototype Theory (...) and the controversies it spurred. The second part surveys a broad range of contemporary theories—Neoclassical Theories, the Prototype Theory, the Theory-Theory, and Conceptual Atomism. (shrink)

At least since W. V. O. Quine's famous critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction, philosophers have been deeply divided over whether there are any analytic truths. One line of thought suggests that the simple fact that people have ' intuitions of analyticity' might provide an independent argument for analyticities. If defenders of analyticity can explain these intuitions and opponents cannot, then perhaps there are analyticities after all. We argue that opponents of analyticity have some unexpected resources for explaining these intuitions and (...) that, accordingly, the argument from intuition fails. (shrink)

The N ational Assembly held in the Frankfurt Paulskirche in 1848, which opened w ith high hopes for the unification o f Germ any on parliam entary constitutional principles, was left to die a year later, in the telling phrase o f D onoso Cortes, ‘like a street w om an in the gu tter’. In the period o f reaction that followed, during w hich the Paulskirche convention came to be described as the ‘parliam ent o f pro­ fessors’, (...) one o f its m em bers, Georg G ottfried Gervinus, was accused, in a trial for high treason, o f attem pting to prove the historical inevitability o f the supersession o f monarchical forms by republican forms. This was Gervinus’s second experience as a professorial m artyr. In 1837 he had been one o f the professors at the U niversity o f G ottingen, the ‘Gottingen Seven’, w ho protested the revocation o f the H anoverian constitution. For this he had been banished and given three days to leave the kingdom. The lesson he, and m any other liberal thinkers, learned from these experiences was that the Germ an middle classes were incapable o f perform ing the historical role assigned to them; they lacked the political will to establish a republican order. (shrink)

I n Citizenshi p an d Migration : Globalizatio n an d th e Politic s o f Belongin g publishe d in 2000 , Alastai r Davidso n an d I showe d tha t globalisatio n an d migratio n thro w u p serious challenge s fo r citizenship . Thi s articl e goe s further , b y examinin g change s resultin g from th e emergenc e o f a ne w constellatio n (...) o f internationa l politics , whic h I refe r t o a s the hierarchica l nation-stat e syste m . Th e bipola r syste m o f th e Col d Wa r i s bein g superseded b y a ne w dichotom y betwee n Nort h an d South , bu t wit h a singl e super-powe r dominating both . Fo r th e firs t tim e i n history , mos t o f th e world ’ s peopl e hav e th e lega l statu s of citizenshi p an d liv e i n politie s wit h th e lega l for m o f democrati c nation-states . Althoug h all nation-state s ar e formall y equa l i n status , ther e i s i n realit y a hierarch y wit h regar d t o such factor s a s internationa l law , rule s o n trade , monopol y o f th e mean s o f mas s destructio n and influenc e o n globa l governance . Thi s make s i t necessar y t o mov e fro m th e notio n of differentiated and contradictory citizenship tha t w e outline d i n 200 0 t o a notio n o f hierarchical citizenship, base d o n shar p difference s i n th e degre e o f empowermen t an d right s tha t citizenship o f variou s type s o f state s confers . Hierarchica l citizenshi p help s t o shap e th e right s and life-chanc e o f differen t group s a t bot h th e nationa l an d internationa l levels . I t i s closely linke d t o discourse s o n th e naturalnes s o f violenc e an d chao s i n th e South , whic h help s to legitimat e Norther n dominance. (shrink)

El presente artículo trata de las ideas de inte r pretación e int e g ridad s e gún D w orkin, al tiempo que considera e r róneo el posit i vismo jurídico y sostiene la e xistencia de la objet i vidad moral y jurídica. Así mismo, plantea que la idea de "tomar algo como propio" es esencial para la idea de inte r pretación, y conclu y e a f i r mando que la inte r pretación (...) en el derecho, como en la democracia, se basa en lo que la gente realmente cree. De ahí se deduce que considerar el proceso de e v aluación de las prácticas jurídicas un asunto de "inte r pretación const r uct i v a" resulte en g añoso, ya que lo más llamat i v o de la teoría de la inte r pretación de D w orkin reside simplemente en que ofrece una crítica moral (sólida) de las prácticas e xistentes en relación con una concepción muy abstracta de la igualdad. Esta conclusión se con f i r ma con la distinción que D w orkin esta b lece entre los a r gumentos de "ajuste" y "sustancia" en el razonamiento jurídico, pues está claro que los a r gumentos de ajuste son sólo a r gumentos de sustancia disfrazados. Los a r gumentos en torno al ajuste ganan peso gracias al principio moral basado en el cumplimiento de las e xpectat i v as razona b les y al principio democrático que se basa en la idea de que la l e gislatura tiene el derecho moral de l e gisla r . Las conclusiones generales a las que se ll e ga en el presente ar tículo son que la teoría de la int e g ridad de D w orkin está orientada en la práctica al mundo real y que, de este modo, constitu y e únicamente una teoría de la "s e gunda mejor opción", y que el derecho inspirado en el ideal de justicia si r v e mejor como modelo con el que comparar las teorías del mundo real. En pa r ticula r , en lo que se re f iere al modelo de justicia, jamás se les podría pedir a los jueces que mintieran (como reconoce D w orkin que podría ser el caso de la int e g ridad), se preser v aría la estrecha con e xión entre derecho y justicia en el entendimiento común, y los casos difíciles se entenderían mejor como llama mientos directos a la justicia. (shrink)

[Allen W. Wood] Kant's moral philosophy is grounded on the dignity of humanity as its sole fundamental value, and involves the claim that human beings are to be regarded as the ultimate end of nature. It might be thought that a theory of this kind would be incapable of grounding any conception of our relation to other living things or to the natural world which would value nonhuman creatures or respect humanity's natural environment. This paper criticizes Kant's argumentative strategy for (...) dealing with our duties in regard to animals, but defends both his theory and most of his conclusions on these topics. /// [Onora O'Neill] Kant's ethics, like others, has unavoidable anthropocentric starting points: only humans, or other 'rational natures', can hold obligations. Seemingly this should not make speciesist conclusions unavoidable: might not rational natures have obligations to the non-rational? However, Kant's argument for the unconditional value of rational natures cannot readily be extended to show that all non-human animals have unconditional value, or rights. Nevertheless Kant's speciesism is not thoroughgoing. He does not view non-rational animals as mere items for use. He allows for indirect duties 'with regard to' them which afford welfare but not rights, and can allow for indirect duties 'with regard to' abstract and dispersed aspects of nature, such as biodiversity, species and habitats. (shrink)

While top-down descriptors have received much attention in explaining corruption, we develop a grassroots model to describe structural factors that may influence the emergence and spread of an individual’s (un)ethical behavior within organizations. We begin with a discussion of the economics justification of the benefits of competition, a rationale used by firms to adopt structural aides such as the ‹stacking’ practice that was implemented at Enron. We discuss and develop an individual-level theory of planned behavior, then extend it to the (...) dyadic level in an internally competitive organization, and finally extend the dyadic model to the social network. We apply social network theory to predict favorable and unfavorable conditions for the emergence and diffusion of an intraorganizational instance of unethical behavior and find that network conditions favoring the suppression of the emergence of unethical behavior also promote its diffusion. For illustrative purposes, we utilize examples from Enron’s internally competitive structure to embed our arguments in a real world context and bring reality to our theorizing. Implications for both researchers and managers are discussed. (shrink)

While top-down descriptors have received much attention in explaining corruption, we develop a grassroots model to describe structural factors that may influence the emergence and spread of an individual’s (un)ethical behavior within organizations. We begin with a discussion of the economics justification of the benefits of competition, a rationale used by firms to adopt structural aides such as the ‹stacking’ practice that was implemented at Enron. We discuss and develop an individual-level theory of planned behavior, then extend it to the (...) dyadic level in an internally competitive organization, and finally extend the dyadic model to the social network. We apply social network theory to predict favorable and unfavorable conditions for the emergence and diffusion of an intraorganizational instance of unethical behavior and find that network conditions favoring the suppression of the emergence of unethical behavior also promote its diffusion. For illustrative purposes, we utilize examples from Enron’s internally competitive structure to embed our arguments in a real world context and bring reality to our theorizing. Implications for both researchers and managers are discussed. (shrink)